A label mixing two scripts
The homograph pattern: it renders like a name you trust and resolves elsewhere
аpple.com
Convert a domain between its Unicode and punycode forms, check the 63-byte label limit against the encoded length, and detect the mixed scripts that make one name render identically to another.
Or drop a file anywhere on this panel. Nothing is uploaded: the analysis runs in this tab.
The answer appears here
Paste on the left and press Convert. Nothing leaves this tab.
Nothing else to flag.
No formatting problems, and nothing the rules object to. Worth remembering what that covers: this reads the file you pasted, not the account or cluster it will be applied to.
No finding matches that filter.
Real input you can load into the tool above. Each one shows a different thing going wrong, because that is what the tool is for.
The homograph pattern: it renders like a name you trust and resolves elsewhere
аpple.com
Decoding shows what a user would have seen in the address bar
xn--mnchen-3ya.de
These are the ones that fail silently. The config is accepted, nothing raises an error, and the consequence arrives later.
The 63-byte label limit and the 253-byte name limit apply to the punycode form, and punycode often more than doubles non-ASCII text. A name that looks short can be too long.
Instead:Measure the encoded form. This page shows both lengths against their limits.
A name entirely in one script is exactly what IDN is for. A check that warns on all of them is noise and gets switched off, taking the real signal with it.
Instead:Flag MIXED scripts within a single label. That is the homograph pattern and it has no legitimate use.
IDNA covers the domain part. A non-ASCII local part needs SMTPUTF8 at every hop, and a server without it rejects the address rather than encoding it.
Instead:Test the mailbox separately from the domain.
An internationalised domain is stored as ASCII and displayed as Unicode. Both the security problem and the length problem come out of that gap.
A Cyrillic and a Latin letter can render identically in most fonts, so a name can look exactly like one you trust and resolve somewhere else entirely. Browsers defend by displaying the punycode form instead of the Unicode form when a label mixes scripts, which is why a legitimate site almost never does it. If you did not construct the name yourself, treat a mixed-script label as hostile.
This matters, because a check that flags every internationalised domain is useless noise that gets switched off. A name entirely in one script is exactly what IDN exists for. It is the MIXING that has no legitimate purpose, and that is what gets flagged here.
DNS limits a label to 63 bytes and a whole name to 253, and both are measured on the encoded form rather than on what you typed. Punycode expands non-ASCII text considerably, often more than doubling it, so a name that looks comfortably short can be too long. There is no way around the limit.
Seeing it in a log, a certificate or a header means you are looking at the wire form. Decoding it shows what a user would have seen in the address bar, which is the comparison worth making when you are working out whether a request came from where it claims to have.
IDNA covers the domain part only. A non-ASCII local part before the at sign needs SMTPUTF8 support at every hop, and a server without it rejects the address rather than encoding it. So a working internationalised domain does not imply a working internationalised mailbox, and the two have to be tested separately.
Whether the domain is registered, who owns it, or whether a visually similar name exists. It converts and inspects the string you paste, in your browser, and makes no DNS query. For a real homograph check against a brand you own you need a registry search, which is a different kind of tool.